Tito's lost world <- an opposite view !

[jkraljic at gwtlaw.com]

Two points concerning what Ivo has written - first a minor one on the name HSP - it does not mean the Croatian Party of Justice but the Croatian Party of "State" Rights.  It takes its name from Ante Starcevic's party.  Starcevic used the name in the sense of "state rights," i.e., the rights the Croatian kingdom had vis a vis Hungary and Austria.

I have also seen an interpretation that the name derived from Starvevic's distinction between pseudo-Croats and "true" Croats (pravi Hrvati).  This did not mean a genetic/ethnic differentiation (Starcevic was half-Serb, after all), but a political differentiation to set apart his followers from those seeking to resolve Croatia's plight through cooperation with Hungarians, Austrians, Serbs, and others.

More importantly, I completely disagree with Ivo's equation of Mihailovic with the killing of innocent civilians.  Mihailovic was a member of the Yugolsav Government (Minister of the Army) and the titular head of the "Yugoslav Army in the Homeland."  The evidence is overwhelming that people who claimed to be loyal to Mihailovic committed genocidal acts against innocent Croat and Muslims civilians while at the same time receiving the assistance and support of Italian troops.

Moreover, there is no question that Mihailovic stabbed Tito and the Partisans in the back at Uzice in Serbia in 1941.  We have this on the authority of Milovan Djilas himself, who would have had no particular reason to try to falsify what occurred at Uzice.  Djilas also has horrifying descriptions of what he saw in Foca after the Chetniks withdrew from that town.

Most English-language works that I have read concerning the question of Mihailovic concede that he knew what was going on.  Those who are apologetic for his acts sought to justify it by claiming that he could not exercise control over his troops.  That is questionable at best.

Mihailovic was a military man.  As such, his fate cannot be compared with civilians and lower ranking soldiers who were massacred by the thousands after the war by Tito.

One can certainly question whether in the conditions that existed in 1946 Mihailovic could have received a fair judicial trial.  I certainly concede that the court was a kangaroo court, no less than the courts used to judge the former officials of the NDH.  However, this does not shift the weight of historical evidence which is not in Mihailovic's favor.

Set forth below is an excerpt of a translation of an article by historian Zlatko Dizdar, "Italian Policies Toward Croatian Territories and Their Results During the Second World War" which originally appeared in Croatian in the work "Talijanksa uprava na Hrvatskom prostoru i egzodus Hrvata (1918-1943), Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2001.  The article includes a description of the work of the Chetniks in the coastal areas of Croatia during WWII which will hopefull further elucidate on this issue.

I note that the "Djujic" mentioned in this excerpt is Momcilo Djujic, who died in California several years ago.  NY Times reporter, David Binder, who openly admits his love for the Chetniks, wrote a glowing obituary of Djujic.  Apparently, the New York Times did not see "fit to print" anything concerning the crimes he had been accused of.  Just knowing that fact, and after reading this excerpt, should lead people to wonder how destructive Binder's influence was in coloring the perceptions of what was happening in the foremer Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

John Kraljic

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	"The first contacts between Italian commanders and leaders of Chetnik forces began as a result of the uprising and revolt during July and August 1941.  After the outbreak of the uprising, the Italians allowed as early as September 1941 Chetnik military forces (starting with units, then regiments, and toward the end of 1941, brigades) to be organized under their wing in the area of their occupational zone in the NDH.  Consisting of Greater Serbian nationalists, these forces were to be used to battle against the Partisans.  The actions of the Chetniks, along with the support of the Italian occupier, led to the shattering of the uprising in certain parts of Dalmatia and southern Lika and afterwards in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

By the end of 1941, Italian commanders established contacts with the most important Chetnik leaders in those areas of the NDH that had been reoccupied by Italian forces (S. Radjenovi?, M. Djuji?, I. Trifunovi?, D. Jevdjevic, B. Todorovi?).  The Italians brought them under their influence and control and included them in the common "fight against Communism."  On the basis of a series of agreements, the increased growth of the organization and strengthening of and union with Chetnik forces in the entire Italian occupied area in the NDH continued.  The support provided by the Italians, including necessary supplies, will be used in the "cleansing" of the non-Serb population, especially Croats and Muslims in these areas.

We find the programmatic bases of the Chetnik movement in a series of documents of Chetnik leaders and ideologues from that time.  It is suffient to mention the project of Stevan Moljevi?, "Homogenous Serbia," dated 30 June 1941, the Instructions of General Draza Mihailovi? of 20 December 1941, and the "Survey of the Chetnik Dinaric Division" from March 1942.  They all had the same programmatic goal: the creation of a so-called Greater Serbia at the expense of the historical and national territories of the Croatian and Muslim peoples (as well as certain others), and the establishment of a direct common border between Serbia-Montenegro and Slovenia.  They tied these goals with the cleansing of these areas of their "Muslim and Catholic population" because only Serbs could live in such a Serbia.  According the Draza's program, more than 90% of the NDH's territory, in which more than 2.5 million Catholics and over 800,000 Muslims lived(making up around 70% of the inhabitants, with Serbs making up close to 30% of the remaining population) would become part of such a Serbia.  All of these Croats and Muslims, together with certain other non-Serbs from these areas, had to be eliminated in keeping with Draza's Instructions.  That "cleansing" or more specifically "extermination" of the non-Serb population had to be carried out by Chetnik forces (something the Chetniks did everytime they had the chance to do so).  Thus the programmatic bases of the Chetnik movement in practice became the foundation for genocidal crimes executed by Chetnik forces against Croats and Muslims during the Second World War.

	The Italians bear a large part of the responsibility for these crimes.  One need only keep in mind eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina where, pursuant to an agreement, the Italians gradually surrendered their control of the area to the Chetniks.  Massive crimes involving the extinction of the Muslim and Croat population ensued (from Visegrad, through Gorazde, ?ajnica, Fo?a to Nevesinje).  The Chetniks killed several thousand, and thousands of others fled.

	The Chetnik leadership clearly knew the goals the Italians had in the region and they sought to exploit it to achieve their own plans.  In one report meant for Mihailovi?, Jevdjevi? discussed the tactic of cooperating with the Italian occupier and noted his contacts with representatives of the Italian military toward the end of 1941.  He claimed that ". . . Italy is terribly unhappy with the borders of the Croatian state and is ready, in accordance with their political traditions, to now incite the Serbs against the Croats. . . .  [if] their is a possibility of pulling out some advantage for the Serbian people from this game, we [must] accept it."

	The Italians planned that in the event of a victory of Fascist forces to favor the Serbs "in northern Dalmatia and western Bosnia and after the war to force a plebiscite in the area for its union with Italy." . . . . "[I]n the remainder of Bosnia and Herzegovina [they] wanted to unite the Serbs and Muslims and to have that majority, consisting of 80% of the population, seek some sort of autonomy for Bosnia under an Italian protectorate."  At the same time, the Italians had an alternative plan for the Montenegrin federalists of "attaching Herzegovina to a Greater Montenegro."  Jedjevi? noted that if the Italians "nevertheless lost the war, this policy of sympathy toward the Serbs might be able to lower their accountability at the peace conference."

	This tactical cooperation would lead to "saving [the Serbs] from Ustasha massacres," the takeover of arms and supply of food from the Italians, and the "establishment of a large half-liberated zone in which one could without interference carry out the political and military organization of the Serbian people."  As a result, Chetnik leaders in a number of instances roused "Italy to realize its pretensions and to occupy all of Bosnia, so that we would have greater room for our activities."  However, "the Germans quickly stopped every such attempt by the Italians, preventing Italian divisions from [crossing over] the demarcation line."

	For tactical reasons, Chetnik commanders attempted to include in their formations part of the pro-Serb oriented Muslims and pro-Yugoslav Croat population, but given their practice of committing genocide against Muslims and Croats they did not have any success.

	The new commander of the Italian Second Army, General Mario Roatta, who succeeded General Ambrosio, attempted though political discussions on the ground to turn the situation to Italy's favor with the support of the Chetniks.  He allowed for the formation of Chetnik forces on the basis of an agreement to legalize them and included them as the Militia voluntaria anticomunista (the Volunteer Anti-Communist Militia) within the Second Italian Army under the same conditions as Italian soldiers in the battle against the Communists and the Partisans.  In May 1942 the Italians had 8,000 to 9,000 Chetniks within the Second Italian Army and that number rose to around 15,000 by October 1942, and to about 20,000 in the first half of 1943.  Mihailovi? approved of this cooperation.  In this regard, General G. Zanussi noted that "the more we included Chetniks in our battles, the more the possibilities for the success of our troops increased while decreasing our exposure to losses.  Other than using them in battle against the rebels, the Chetniks worked in our favor as a counterweight in relation to the Ustasha and the Germans.  Having as our friend these enemies of our supposed friend - 10,000 to 15,000 men steeled in the difficulties and cunning of the savage Balkan wars - presented a pawn whose value could not be underestimated."

	All of these Chetnik forces had to be paid for by the NDH government and it had to continue to support them after the Zagreb agreement (19 June 1942) and the withdrawal of the Italians from the III and part of the II Zones and the surrender of civilian authority to the NDH.

	Under the protective guard of the Italians, the Chetniks carried out a series of crimes which they organized and planned in order to bring to life their goal of a "Greater Serbia."  Thus, from September to December 1942 the Chetniks massacred around 70 Croats, mostly women and children, in northern Dalmatia and southern Lika where the Italians held military and civilian control, which caused a refugee wave of Croats from these areas to other parts of the NDH.  During the course of the Italian military operation code-named "Albia" against the Partisans in the Biokovo Mountains, the Chetniks massacred, executed and burned around 160 Croats, including three priests, in the area of the county (Velika zupa) of Cetina alone.  Their commander, Petar Bacovic, reported on this "punishment expedition" to D. Mihailovi? on 5 September 1942 writing that his Chetniks killed more than "1,000 Ustashe" while they had "not one dead or wounded [man]."  He reported that onn the way from Ljubuski to Vrgorac they "skinned three Catholic priests," killed "all the males 15 years old and older," and "completely burned 17 villages," after which they went south of Makarska in song and with a Serbian flag "to the coast of our Adriatic where they planted our flag on the coast."

	Prior to this, the Chetniks in eastern Herzegovina, where they had taken over control (other than in the cities) in agreement with the Italians, killed several hundred Croats and Muslims from May to September 1942 after which the entire Croat and Muslim population on the left bank of the Neretva (around 30,000 people) fled to other areas of the NDH.

	During Italian military operations against the Partisans in the Prozor region in October 1942, the Chetniks first killed around 200 Croats and Muslims in the Mostar region, and then in the Prozor area killed, slaughtered and threw into water or pits 1,716 people (340 were Muslims and the rest Croat civilians).  On their return to the Konji? County, they killed around twenty Croats, plundering houses and villages many of which were burned.

	In an 23 October 1942 telegram Bacovic also reported to Draza Mihailovi?:  "During operations in Prozor more than 2,000 Sokaca [Catholics] and Muslims were slaughtered.  The soldiers returned with enthusiasm."

	Even though the Chetniks clearly considered all Croats and Muslims to be Ustasha and even though civilians numbered the only victims during these operations, neither the Italians nor their supreme commander reacted allowing the Chetniks to continue with their criminal genocide.

	At the beginning of October 1942 in the area of the Cetina County and under the direction and control of the Italians, "in supposed battle against the Partisans," Chetniks led by Vojvoda Mane Rokvi? killed and slaughtered around 200 Croats in the hinterland of Omis and set fire to many houses after plundering them.  As the Italians wrote: "Mostly older people, women and children who had absolutely no connections to the Partisans were slaughtered."  Thereafter the Chetniks of Vojvoda Mom?ilo Djuji? on 21 October 1942 in Bitelica, near Sinj, under Italian direction, killed 29 and in Otisica 6 Croats, having first burned 220 Croatian homes.  According to a report of General Berardia from Knin, the Chetniks in these actions "tortured and butchered every Catholic, and later most of the corpses were cut to pieces in the most brutal way."  All of them were civilians, but he did not react.  Djuji? immediately reported to Mihailovi? by telegram: "Moji su klali sreda!"

	At the end of January 1943, Dalmatian-Herzegovinian Chetniks from the area around Knin carried out actions, within the context of wider offensive activities of the Italian Army against the Partisans, toward the villages in the Vrlicka area, killing over 100 Croats and raping women and young girls, all under the slogan to "burn and butcher all that is Catholic."  At this time they nailed 68 year old Niko Blazevi? to a spit and cooked him until he died, while in Otavica, 86 year old Ilija Mestrovi?, the uncle of famous Croat sculptor Ivan Mestrovi?, was thrown alive into a burning house and was killed. By February 1, 1943, Draza Mihailovi? had received the report of these actions: "In Kijevo and Vrlika Bacovic executed 55 and in Maovaca and Otavica Djujic executed 48 Ustashe."  Thereafter on 3 and 4 February 1943, Herzegovinian Chetniks in the region of Imotski and its surrounding villages slaughtered and killed 32 Croats, plundering and destroying property, burning houses, and raping girls and women.  In all these actions, only Croat civilians fell, who for the Chetniks considered to be all Ustashe; not one Serb nor any village inhabited by Serbs came under attack.  These actions resulted in 3,000 Croat refugees fleeing to Sinj alone.

	In these actions the Italians usually transported the Chetniks to the place of operations and surrounded the settlements so as to prevent the inhabitants from fleeing.  They thereafter allowed the Chetniks to deal with the unarmed populace and divided the booty with them afterwards.

	It needs to be said that the Italians sought through their Second Army to exploit the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The Muslims found themselves in an ever more complicated and difficult position and exposed to genocide.  The Italians wanted to used the Muslims as a political tool to support their goal in occupying the Croatian coastline and the Herzegovinian hinterland and to establish a protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Some, such as General Giuseppe Pieche, believed this to be a possible economic and military solution for Dalmatia, even though Italian forces had withdrawn from a substantial portion of the area.  As a result, they accepted the formation of a number of anti-Communist Muslim units (bands) under Italian oversight, following the visit to Rome of a Muslim autonomist delegation from Mostar in November 1942.  They viewed these units as a counterweight to the Chetniks, but also as a tool against the NDH.  After the Chetnik massacres, the Italians also had to allow part of the Croats in Dalmatia and Herzegovina (in the II Zone) to establish armed formations.  But, in practice the establishment of cooperation between Italians and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained subordinate to Italian-Chetnik cooperation and as result did not became important either in number or in activities.

	The British government reacted in connection to the news of the above-mentioned Chetnik massacres (though more so as a result of their even more terrible massacres of Muslims, especially in eastern Bosnia and the neighboring areas of Sandzak, carried out from January to March 1943 under the oversight and command of Draza Mihailovi?).  These massacres had been made possible by the Italian turnover of their administration in these areas to the Chetniks and supplying them with arms, food and money, as well as by permitting them to be transported from Serbia and Montenegro.  On 1 May 1943 the British government informed Mihailovi? that the Chetnik leadership needed to "soften their position" toward the Muslims.  Soon after legendary French General Charles DeGaulle, the leader of the Free French movement, based on false information provided by Slobodan Jovanovi?'s exiled Yugoslav government, awarded medals D. Mihailovi?, Zaharija Ostoji? and a number of other Chetnik commanders who participated in the above mentioned actions and had been responsible for the greatest of massacres.  They took such awards as being an initiative to continue with such actions.

	It must be emphasized that the Chetniks without exception killed all antifascist Croats and Muslims, activists, soldiers and Partisans they captured.  For example, the Dinarska Chetnik Division alone from 25 May 1942 to 15 June 1942 in battles with the Partisans, counted "over 500 Partisan corpses, mostly Croats."  Somewhat later in 1942 in Rujista the Chetniks captured 23 Croat Partisans and executed them for which they received a 10,000 lira award from the Italians and which was the biggest initiative for the crime.

	The Chetniks victimized Serb antifascists as well, especially during the January-March 1943 offensive, in which the Chetniks participated as units of the MVAC, that is, as an integral part of Italian forces, in operations from the Gorski kotar, Lika and Kordun, and across northern Dalmatia and southwestern Bosnia to Herzegovina.

	Even to this day, all of the Chetnik victims, like all of the Ustasha victims, have yet to be identified, especially those resulting from combined actions under the operative and actual command of the commander of the Second Italian Army and his subordinate corps and division commanders in the area of the II and III Italian Occupation Zones in the NDH."
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