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>"jon.lovebytes" <jon at lovebytes.org.uk>

Te pupic dulce ... bugamiaspulainpizdamatii



This is a multi-part message in WISE format ... pointedly



The Body Is the Mind In Mind Time

We misunderstand the concepts body, mind, and spirit when we
presuppose that they refer to separate distinct things.  We pluck
these names out of the river of our living experience to identify
aspects of who we are.  We are badly mistaken when we think of these
separate ideas as separate realities that are opposed to each
other.  "Body," "mind," and "spirit" are all names that refer to our
whole self.  When we make those concepts separate entities we create
enormous confusion. Our culture wallows in that confusion today.  It
is time to get back to basics.

        Merleau-Ponty situates the relations between bodies and
souls best.  For him, body and soul are terms that make sense only
in relation with each other.  Body is prior to soul.  Soul is a
higher degree of organization of body.  The process is an ascending
one.  For the body as a mass of chemical components in interaction,
the organism is soul.  For the organism, the living body interacting
with its biological and social milieu is soul.  At the next level,
the body as social subject in its group is soul.  The process is a
dialectic one of creative contradiction where the body transcends
itself as soul while not losing its bodily reality.  In short, "The
body in general is an ensemble of paths already traced, of powers
already constituted; the body is the acquired dialectical ground
upon which a higher `formation' is accomplished, and the soul is the
meaning which is then established" (1963, p. 210).

Madison explains the relations between body and soul in the
following passage:

The relations between soul and body must then be thought of as
relations between two relative and varying terms in a single
dialectic where the first term encompasses and surpasses the second,
but where the second serves as a foundation and condition of
possibility for the first (p. 11).

        In Merleau-Ponty's words: "It is not a question of two de
facto orders external to each other, but of two types of relations,
the second of which integrates the first" (1963, pp.180-181).
Merleau-Ponty was saying that the body provides the stuff and the
impetus for the soul which,
in turn, integrates that stuff and gives it conscious unity.
Finally in this regard Madison observed,

There are certainly not two substances in man, but nevertheless man
is not a rigidly monolithic entity.  There is indeed a "soul" and
a "body," but the body is a human body only in being the very
foundation of the soul, the visible expression of a "spiritual"
life; and the soul is a soul only by means of the body which is like
its very appearance.  (p.12).

          We are bodies in the world.  Our every experience contains
both ourselves and our environment, both a subjective and an
objective pole.  Nietzsche (1962) pointed this out over one hundred
years ago.  He said, "It is absolutely impossible for a subject to
see or have insight into something while leaving itself out of the
picture" (p. 83).  Heidegger said the same.  He decided that every
experience that we might have can be described as being-in-the-
world.  He showed that the ideas of being and world are mere
abstractions from that experience.  We do not experience our being
apart from the world nor the world apart from our being.  We have a
unitary experience that is somehow also differentiated.

        Heidegger tries to put across this idea by hyphenating the
phrase, being-in-the-world.          Within this joint-but-
differentiated experience, our being is our sense of ourselves as we
relate to the world.  This sense of ourselves, sometimes called I-
feeling, is not fixed in a solidified ego.  Sometimes we feel tiny
and isolated.  At other times we feel as big as all outdoors.  In
either case, the field of outer reality is part of our experience.
 From our I-feeling we abstract the ideas of body, mind, soul, and
spirit.  Body we
conceive to be mechanical and material.  It is not; it is alive and
alert.  Mind is thought of as our thinking part which is immaterial.
It is not a real part separate from the rest of us and it is not
immaterial except as an abstraction.  We conceive of spirit as the
all-pervading life force of the universe and soul as our own life
force.  As such neither is separate from our bodies or immaterial.

         It is time to declare that the body is the mind.  Doing so
clears the air.  It is also time to declare that the body is the
soul.  At the very least, we have to say that mind and soul are
simply more developed organizations of the body.  Or in the words of
Madison (1981),

Spirit is not a new kind of being but a new form of unity.  Since,
therefore, spirit is not a kind of substance or a being-in-itself,
it would be better to speak, not of a spiritual order and a bodily
order, but quite simply of a human order (p. 12).

Soul in our culture indicates the enduring self, our source of
inspiration, something in touch with spirit, providing guidance and
awareness. This is a description of the body.  Only one aspect that
we customarily attribute to the soul is not applicable to the body,
immateriality.  That is a virtue of the body,    not a vice.
Immateriality is an untestable attribute of an overly abstracted
idea of who we are.  We are bodies.  Our bodies are our souls.

             Our bodies make us wise. 










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My...body is not an object ...it assembles into a cluster
the "consciousnesses" adherent to its hands, to its eyes, by an
operation that is in relation to them lateral, transversal [i.e., of
the same basic quality: not superior; ..."my consciousness" is not
the synthetic, centrifugal unity of a multitude of "consciences of."
[i.e., not an aggregate of divergent sensations.  Rather,] it is
sustained and subtended by the prereflective and preobjective unity
of my body  (1964a, pp.141-142).

Michael Eigen in his text, The Psychotic Core (1986), discussed the
breakdown of psychotic patients as they mentally straightjacket
themselves into roles in which they become either completely
isolated from the world or else lose all sense of themselves as
separate beings.  He points out that we are both separate from  the
world and united to it; and we need to incorporate both experiences
into a healthy POLITIKAL SYSTEM ... We exist separately from each other,  
but we share the same "flesh."