Should USA "Redefine the Enemy?"

[Ivo Skoric]

Jenkins desperately tries to think "out of the box" - but that is 
simply impossible for him who spent more than 30 years inside the 
box.

That's why his analysis reads like a comedy. He reminds me of various 
senior advisors to top ranking communist party members of old 
Yugoslavia, who wrote countless analytic papers like this one in the 
decade after Tito's death.

They all contained a fundamental flaw: they all thought about 
redefining communist Yugoslavia, instead of abandoning it and 
accepting the real change. 

In analogy, Jenkins's flaw is that he is still thinking of IT as a 
war that needs to be won. OK, suicide bombers are indeed a different 
kind of enemy than Soviets. And, indeed, they may have their own 
valid reasons for acting the way they were. 

But we can still WIN. We just need to redefine our way of fighting. 
Tsk, tsk, tsk.... Never learn they will, as Yoda would say. What 
Jenkins refuses to accept is that this war cannot be won, and 
therefore that it is not worth fighting. 

Instead the reasons for it need to be removed - economically, 
politically, culturally, in ways not yet imagined by anybody, least 
the good old marine who made the career of selling advice on how to 
win wars.

ivo

On 21 May 2004 at 19:34, CERJ at igc.org wrote:

"There are no noncombatants."

WTF kind of statement is this?

Brian Michael Jenkins is a senior adviser to the president of the 
RAND
Corporation and, according to RAND, "one of the world’s leading
authorities on international terrorism."

I vigorously disagree with this article on many points -- mainly its
entire worldview -- but it's an example of the kind of thing that the
US government might be inclined to listen to these days.

To me, it sounds like a 'swan song'.

This guy talks about 'changing our midsets' ... he should start by
looking in the mirror.  It is the 'us vs them' mindset that has to
change.

-- John Wilmerding
_ _ _

Brian M. Jenkins founded the RAND Corporation's terrorism research
program in 1972, has written frequently on "terrorism", and has 
served
as an advisor to the federal government and the private sector on the
subject.  He is a former Army captain who served with Special Forces
in the Dominican Republic  and later in Vietnam (1966-70), and is 
also
a former deputy chairman of Kroll Associates, which develops
electronics end-user products and is a major government contractor. 
In 1996, he was appointed by President Clinton to be a member of the
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.  He has 
served
as an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism (1999-2000), 
and
in 2000 was appointed as a member of the U.S. Comptroller General's
Advisory Board.  He is also a special advisor to the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and a member of the board of directors of
the ICC's Commercial Crime Services.

Jenkins has authored many books, including 'International Terrorism: 
A
New Mode of Conflict'.  He is the editor and co-author of 'Terrorism
and Personal Protection', coeditor and coauthor of 'Aviation 
Terrorism
and Security', and coauthor of 'The Fall of South Vietnam'.  He is
often interviewed on terrorism-related issues on all three major U.S.
networks, BBC, CNN, and Fox News Channel, and for newspaper articles
in New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and L.A.
Times as well as Associated Press and Reuters news services.

http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2004/enemy.ht
ml

Redefining the Enemy
The World Has Changed, But Our Mindset Has Not
by Brian Michael Jenkins

We wage a "global war on terror"—a confusing conflation of
threats—while we continue to concentrate on future conventional wars
with hypothetical, nation-state foes.  We still consign all "lesser
contingencies" to the "other war" as opposed to the "real war."  We
still tend to view the enemy through the narrow bores and restricted
optics of our existing national security structure.  The 9/11
Commission hearings reveal the difficulty we have in addressing foes
that fall outside our normal field of vision.  We tend to focus on
what we can hit with our capabilities.

Our imagination fails us when it comes to low-tech, high-consequence
attack scenarios.  At the other end of the spectrum, I believe that 
we
overestimate the readiness of even those we label "rogue states" to
provide uncontrolled terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.  At
the same time, we cling to the comforting notion that terrorists
cannot ascend above a certain level of violence without state 
support,
that al Qaeda could not have done 9/11 on its own and certainly could
not acquire a nuclear capability without government sponsorship.

While we argue whether organized crime would participate in a nuclear
black market (which, in fact, would never operate like a traditional
black market), we miss the more complex wildcat operation of
Pakistan’s senior nuclear scientists.  We tend to treat drug
traffickers and terrorists as a single hyphenated foe -- another
simplistic conflation, albeit one that was useful in overcoming the
equally mistaken notion that the United States could assist in
combating the drug traffic in Colombia without countering the
insurgents financed by it.  But then priorities change, and we ignore
the vital role of the drug traffic in central Asia as we
single-mindedly pursue terrorists.

We continue to debate whether terrorism should be treated as war or 
as
crime, with military force or through law enforcement.  We
underestimate the power of militarily inferior foes, tribal 
loyalties,
difficult terrain, religious conviction, unceasing hostilities,
gruesome images broadcast on television, and other unconventional
measures of power.

It is time for us to take a deliberately unconventional, broad, and
inclusive approach.  The objective here is to avoid depicting the
enemy as a convenient mirror image of our existing organization,
missions, capabilities, and preferences, and instead to sketch a
dynamic group portrait of the foes we are already dealing with today
and will be dealing with for the foreseeable future.  My intention is
not to argue for one threat over another.  No single scenario
predominates.  That is the point.

New World Disorder

For the United States, the enemy or -- more correctly -- the enemies
we face have changed fundamentally over the past decade.  In addition
to a few hostile or potentially hostile states, our enemies include
terrorists, weapons proliferators, organized crime affiliates, drug
traffickers, and cyber-outlaws.  In some circumstances, we may find
ourselves confronting embittered factions motivated by long-standing
religious, ethnic, or tribal conflicts.  The enemies of yesterday 
were
static, predictable, homogeneous, rigid, hierarchical, and resistant
to change.  The enemies of today are dynamic, unpredictable, diverse,
fluid, networked, and constantly evolving.

There is no single military power that can match the United States,
but the diverse adversaries pose an array of security challenges. 
Each one is unique, requiring great adaptability on our part. 
Predictability, which all institutions seek, is not on the horizon. 
Responses dictated by military doctrine will not work.

Today’s foes do not threaten the global devastation that would result
from an all-out nuclear exchange -- the paramount concern during the
Cold War -- but their capabilities could nonetheless ascend to
disastrous levels of destruction.  And, because of the greater
likelihood of their initiating hostile action, today’s foes, were 
they
able to obtain even primitive weapons of mass destruction, may be
considered even more dangerous than would those of yesterday.

Meanwhile, borders have dissolved.  There are no front lines.  There
are no noncombatants.  Our defenses begin abroad but do not end at 
our
borders.  Our defenses must continue within our own territory. 
Increasingly, our foes operate not on conventional battlefields, but
in a gray area where traditional notions of crime and armed conflict
overlap.

In the case of international terrorism, we in America originally
viewed the problem as primarily a law enforcement one, seeking the
cooperation of the international community either in outlawing and
preventing attacks against certain targets (commercial aviation,
diplomats, and diplomatic facilities) or in preventing the use of
certain tactics like taking hostages, while asserting our legal
jurisdiction either to apprehend terrorists abroad or to use military
force in response to terrorist attacks.  Since Sept. 11, 2001, we 
have
treated international terrorism more as a form of war, although we
still depend heavily upon law enforcement, here and abroad, to
apprehend individual terrorists.  We should be learning that we 
cannot
choose between one or the other, either law enforcement or war. 
Effectively responding to the foes we face requires orchestrating
activities in both dimensions.  In addition, we need to invent some
entirely new -- for us, at least -- concepts.

The threats we face today are likely to engage us for many years. 
Chronic conflicts lasting decades persist in several parts of the
world: Burma, Colombia, India, Peru, the Philippines, Sudan, Sri
Lanka, and the Basque region of Spain.  In a similar fashion, our
terrorist foes see war as a perpetual condition.  They are determined
to beleaguer us, destroy our domestic tranquility, disrupt our
economy, make our lives untenable.  For Americans, accustomed to
thinking of war as a finite undertaking, the notion of permanent war
is especially hard to accept.

Political, economic, and technological developments during the past 
15
years have also fundamentally altered the ecology of armed conflict
and crime.  The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
empire, the globalization of the economy, and the rapid development 
of
information technologies have generated new causes of conflict,
created new vulnerabilities, and provided adversaries with new
capabilities.  Consequently, we now face a far more complex tapestry
of intractable threats:

* Large-scale terrorist attacks that may take place anywhere in the
world, including the U.S. homeland 

* the continuing development in some countries of weapons of mass
destruction, and the possibility that these may come into the hands 
of
political or criminal gangs

* chronic warfare, that in some countries has become a lucrative
economic enterprise

* local and regional ethnic and tribal conflicts that may suddenly
erupt in genocide and humanitarian disasters, or that may preserve
chaotic ungoverned 'badlands' where warlords and terrorists find
refuge 

* increasingly globalized organized crime engaged in drug 
trafficking,
the smuggling of human beings, and possibly trafficking in the
ingredients of weapons of mass destruction

* the exploitation of the Internet by criminals or terrorists

* the potential for sophisticated remote sabotage. 

All of these threats have been elevated to the level of national
security concerns, meriting the employment of military assets, at
times requiring military intervention even in cases where U.S.
security may not be directly threatened.  Of particular importance to
those charged with national security, these threats do not align with
how we have organized ourselves -- our military assets, our troops,
our planning scenarios -- to deal with national security.

As evidenced by structural adjustments within the government, we have
begun to adapt through:

* the merger of several departments to create a separate department
for homeland security

* the erection of "scaffolds" (such as the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center) to bridge gaps between institutions

* the creation of entirely new entities like the Transportation
Security Agency and the Pentagon’s new North America Command

* the continuing exhortations to improve information sharing and
interdepartmental cooperation, and talk about additional new entities
to address specific tasks now performed with difficulty by existing
institutions -- an MI5 for America, modeled on the British security
service.

We have re-configured our institutions to better address "the spaces
in between," but we have been far more reluctant to tamper with the
basic institutions themselves.  We have not fundamentally changed our
habits of thought.

Most of the threats also transcend national frontiers, demonstrating
the limits of protection that any national government can provide to
its citizens.  Combating the threats will require sustained political
will and a level of international coordination that remains to be
achieved.  But how much coordination can be achieved without 
affecting
the core element of sovereignty?  Our European allies are struggling
with this issue now.

The U.S. armed forces today naturally continue to train for war with
an enemy that could pose a direct military challenge -- the potential
"near-peers."  The most frequently mentioned candidates are a 
powerful
and hostile China or a revived revanchist Russia, although their need
for stability and economic growth make war with either seem unlikely.

On the next tier down, in our hierarchy of standard planning
scenarios, are regional powers like North Korea or potentially Iran. 
These countries now or may soon possess strategic weapons that could
directly threaten U.S. territory.

But while looking toward enemies who might aspire to fight on our
terms, the armed forces actually fight a very different set of
battles: a bloody resistance movement in Iraq; a combination of the
Taliban, al Qaeda, and warlords in Afghanistan; a worldwide manhunt
for the leaders of al Qaeda.  Then there are those conflicts that do
not directly threaten our national security but require military 
force
to rescue or protect American citizens, restore order, apprehend an
accused war criminal or an indicted head of state, prevent ethnic
cleansing, retaliate for acts of terrorism, or hunt for terrorist
leaders.

Such operations account for most of the U.S. military interventions 
in
the last quarter century: Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Iran, Panama, 
Iraq,
Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sudan, the Philippines,
Liberia, and now Haiti again.  Future scenarios could see civil war 
in
Iraq, collapse in Afghanistan, chaos in North Korea or post-Castro
Cuba, a coup in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, U.S. hostages taken in
Colombia, or possibly some disaster that causes a collapse in Mexico,
sending a tidal wave of desperate refugees streaming north.

Often in such cases, we will be confronting petty tyrants and local
warlords commanding inferior but vicious militias, engaged in ethnic
or tribal conflict, or dedicated to war as a profitable enterprise,
while hundreds of thousands of civilian victims clamor for 
protection.
 Our enemies will not be nations or armies, but small groups of
individuals or angry mobs.  To respond to them will require
adaptability and rapidly mobilized, specialized local knowledge.

In terms of intelligence, we need to be able to get smart fast.  We
need the capability for networked, multilateral threat analysis --
comparable to "real-time intelligence on the battlefield" -- to
generate information that can be packaged and used quickly by a
soldier in Afghanistan, a magistrate in France, a cop in Singapore, a
Marine in Haiti.  We do not yet have this capability.

Countering Proliferation

At one time, I would have argued that there was a firebreak between
weapons proliferation at the national level and potential terrorist
use of weapons of mass destruction.  Historically, terrorists seldom
sought mass casualties.  Morality and self-image -- plus practical
concerns about group cohesion, alienating perceived constituents, or
provoking popular crackdowns -- constrained their violence.

As we have seen, however, these self-imposed constraints, which were
never universal or immutable, eroded significantly in the last decade
of the 20th century, especially among those inspired by religious
ideologies, which, in their view, provided God’s mandate.  Large-
scale
indiscriminate violence became more common, while some groups sought
more exotic means of inflicting death and causing alarm.

A cult in Japan unleashed nerve gas in Tokyo’s subways, but not 
before
it had experimented with biological weapons and made inquiries about
the availability of nuclear weapons in Russia.  The avatars of al
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah have shown persistent interest in 
chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.  Fortunately, their
capabilities still trail their ambitions.  We are most likely to see
crude scenarios in which the psychological effects vastly exceed the
actual casualties, but weapons of mass destruction have entered the
terrorists’ imagination, if not yet their arsenal.

It is still wrong to conflate national proliferation efforts with
terrorist ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction.  
Dictators
of rogue states that acquire nuclear weapons seem unlikely to turn
them over to uncontrolled terrorists except perhaps as part of an
Armageddon defense.  However, proliferation at the state level does
indirectly facilitate terrorist acquisition through the spread of
know-how and arsenals.  Ironically, though, successfully shutting 
down
weapons research may also promote underground proliferation.  Rogue
scientists, deprived of opportunities in national programs -- as in
Russia, Iraq, or Libya -- may seek other profitable outlets for their
expertise.  While some scientists may seek compensation, others may
look for revenge.  This is the stuff of scary novels, but the 
distance
between what we read on airplanes and what we read in intelligence
estimates has narrowed.

The imperative to destroy weapons of mass destruction has been
complicated by the trend toward smaller groups of adversaries -- and
by our responses to them.  As a consequence of perceived U.S.
intelligence failures in Iraq, it will now be very difficult to
mobilize support for military intervention aimed at regime change for
the stated purpose of neutralizing weapons of mass destruction. 
Preemption in the future may instead need to be aimed at specific
facilities to be investigated or destroyed, specific shipments of
material to be intercepted, or specific individuals to be targeted. 
To support these missions will place even greater demands on
intelligence, accuracy, speed, and precision.  Waiting too long to 
act
will increase the threat; getting it wrong will further erode our
already damaged credibility.

"Soldiers" of Terrorism

The most immediate threat we face is terrorism.  The global jihad
being waged by al Qaeda and like-minded Islamist fanatics draws upon
these historical roots: 

* Muslim reactions to colonial rule 

* continued military defeats at the hands of the West 

* a deep sense of humiliation and desire for revenge 

* failures of governments and economies in North Africa, the Middle
East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia

* increased emigration and the isolation and alienation often felt by
marginalized immigrant communities

* a growing sense of unity among all Muslims fed by charismatic
communicators, like Osama bin Laden, who use images of suffering -- 
in
Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, and Iraq, reinforced daily on Arab
satellite television -- to indoctrinate followers

* the common sense of purpose and lasting connections created by the
ultimately successful jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

We avoid the construct, but it is -- for America’s current jihadist
foes -- a religious war starting centuries ago and lasting until
judgment day.  It is this mindset that has been grafted upon the
tactics of contemporary terrorism.  The two now flow together,
applying jihadist codes of operation to a terrorist repertoire.  It 
is
a powerful and dangerous combination.

Today’s terrorist adversaries have no intention of matching America’s
superior military capability.  They intend to exploit its
vulnerabilities.  Like all religious fanatics, they see themselves as
morally superior, armed with the sword of God, commanded to wage a
holy war.  They see Americans as soulless, spineless, materialistic
beings, unwilling to make sacrifices -- people whose sole measures of
well-being are the Dow Jones average and retail consumption, 
desperate
for the peace and tranquility that the terrorists can deny.

The 9/11 attacks had cascading effects on the economy.  Total direct
and indirect costs amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars, and
the effects are still being felt in some sectors.  Terrorists have
recognized the potential of economic warfare.  They speak about this
potential more often, although they have yet to fully exploit it.

Tomorrow’s terrorists might become more adept in this endeavor.  They
could attempt to destroy our economy through terror alone -- periodic
devastating attacks, perhaps years apart, that will ensure the
credibility of their continuing threats in the years in between.  
They
already are becoming more adept at shaping our perceptions, 
exploiting
the global news media to conduct "effect-based operations" in which
they observe and measure how their own chatter and threats provoke
security alerts that impose costly security measures and disrupt the
economy.

Or they might move in the direction of cyber-terrorism, applying
technical skills to the task of protracted warfare against our
information systems and commerce, possibly even carrying out remote
physical sabotage via the Internet.  What is now competitive "sport"
to design a more malicious computer virus could become a
more-organized strategy of destruction, or "virtual jihad."

"Combatants" of Organized Crime

The same conditions that foster terrorism also provide opportunities
to organized crime.  Failed government institutions, collapse of
authority, cities filled with unemployed young men can be found in
badlands and bad neighborhoods around the world.  Organized crime has
exploited its new space, as any other business corporation would, to
include global sourcing, diversifying into new profitable areas,
developing new markets, creating new business alliances.

The relationships between organized crime and terrorism are diverse
and complex.  To finance their operations, some terrorist groups have
turned to crime or forged alliances of convenience with criminal
groups, as in Colombia.  In other parts of the world, organized crime
is so pervasive and powerful that it challenges the state, as in the
Balkans.  In still other countries, the rulers themselves are
criminals commanding states -- sovereign outlaws.

Gangsters may recruit extremists to carry out terrorist attacks, as 
in
Mumbai, India.  National governments may employ criminals to attack
foreign foes.  Insurgents may move into organized crime.  
Professional
criminals may act as middlemen in the transfer of small arms,
explosives, or the ingredients of weapons of mass destruction; or 
they
may provide the routes for the clandestine delivery of such weapons. 
Money-laundering is an industry that serves both terrorists and
organized crime.

Smaller but More Virulent

Power is descending.  Violence is escalating.  In 1974, I wrote that
the power to kill, destroy, disrupt, cause alarm, and oblige 
societies
to divert vast resources to security is descending into the hands of
smaller and smaller groups whose grievances, real or imaginary, it
will not always be possible to satisfy.  The irreconcilables,
fanatics, and lunatics -- who have existed throughout history -- have
become an increasingly potent force to be reckoned with.

Subsequent events have borne this out.  Over the past three decades,
terrorists have multiplied the number of their victims by an order of
magnitude every 15 years.  In the 1970s, the bloodiest terrorist
incidents involved tens of fatalities.  By the 1990s, hundreds were
being killed in the worst incidents, and these occurred more
frequently.  In 2001, the number reached the thousands, and today we
fear scenarios in which tens of thousands might die.

Killing on this scale is hard to do.  Conventional explosives alone
won't suffice, nor will chemical weapons, unless used in massive
quantities, or radiological attacks.  Only biological or nuclear
weapons can attain this level of lethality.

The exchange ratios are aligned against us. As we concern ourselves
more with avoiding collateral casualties, even conserving the lives 
of
enemy soldiers, our terrorist foes are more willing to carry out
large-scale indiscriminate attacks.  While our tolerance for friendly
casualties has declined, terrorists have turned their religious
conviction into a weapons system based on their readiness to die.

Time to Change

Increasingly, we are at war not with enemy states or enemy armies but
with small groups of people or with specific individuals: fugitive
terrorists, drug traffickers, warlords, dangerous dictators, rogue
scientists.  We find ourselves in the domain of manhunts, lethal
take-downs, and individually targeted killings.  The nature of these
missions blurs military operations with law enforcement, changes the
rules of engagement, and increases the requirement for precision,
whether in economic coercion or in the application of military power. 

That, in turn, increases the demands on intelligence and the ability
to rapidly exploit it.

Yet powerful institutional barriers to fundamental change remain.  In
the armed forces, there is still a tendency to view the current
situation as an anomaly -- as the "other war" as opposed to the "real
war," as missions to be consigned to specialized units rather than to
main forces, as opportunities to gain valuable field experience but
not a compelling argument to radically alter how we organize to 
fight.
 We adapt incrementally.  Given our great strength, that may suffice. 

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Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 20:25:24 +0200 (CEST)
To: syndicate at anart.no
From: mpalmer at jps.net
Subject: MORAL DILEMMAS
In-Reply-To: 
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MORAL DILEMMAS
IN 3 PARTS

PART I

Would you kill a person if it meant saving humanity?
How about if it meant saving a million people?
How about if it meant saving a thousand?
How about if it meant saving one?
How about if it meant saving a million of your worse enemies who only want to kill you?
How about if the person you had to kill to save humanity had the evil intentions of a Hitler and the means to carry them out?
How about if the person you had to kill to save humanity was your only child?
How about if you had to destroy humanity to save your only child?
How about if you had to kill yourself to save humanity?
How about if you had to kill yourself to save a million people?
How about if you had to kill yourself to save a thousand?
How about if you had to kill yourself to save one person?
How about if that one person you could save was your only child?


PART II

For "kill" in the above, substitute "torture" and redo where appropriate.
Such as:
Would you torture a person if it meant saving humanity?
Etc.


PART III

For "torture" in the above, substitute "reveal the secrets of" and redo where appropriate.
Such as:
Would you reveal the secrets of a person if it meant saving humanity?
Etc.


mwp