Tito's lost world <- an opposite view !

[Ivo Skoric]

One can certainly question whether in the conditions that existed in
1946 Mihailovic could have received a fair judicial trial.  I
certainly concede that the court was a kangaroo court, no less than
the courts used to judge the former officials of the NDH. 

>> Naturally, John, I thought along those lines. Of course that 
Mihajlovic richly deserved a trial - both for the treason and for 
crimes against humanity that troops under his command committed. I 
just wanted to state an example that not only Croats were put on 
politically motivated trials by Tito's communists after the ww II. 
And Djilas - that you mention - was also jailed by Tito on numerous 
occassions, he not a Croat, and not a criminal. Interesting to 
observe from today's perspective that Mihajlovic would probably be a 
war criminal under the definitions not yet available at that time. 
Also, are you sure that all the victims on the HSP list are innocent 
civilians, and that none among them was an enemy collaborator, or, 
worse, liable for crimes comparable to Mihajlovic's? Of course, i do 
not believe that arbitrary mass executions like the one at Bleiburg 
were the right way to deal with that. Both Croats and Serbs are 
particularly irritated by communist trials against their clergy. Yet, 
in various degrees, clergy on both sides exceeded their brief in 
secular political activity - sometimes personally involving 
themselves in high crimes (like Djujic). Stepinac case is the most 
intriguing there (stories and facts about him differ widely depending 
on sources), because due to his high rank he obviously could not 
involve himself in crimes - even if speculatively he would want to, 
and since he, unlike Mihajlovic, did not have troops under his 
command, he can hardly be held responsible under command 
responsibility clause. He was tried and convicted for collaboration 
with the enemy (note - not for treason). In that respect Serbs are 
angry, because they believe he was a spiritual leader behind the 
atrocities committed by Ustashas, that he blessed; and Croats are 
furious, because they hold him completely innocent of any wrongdoing, 
even quoting his sermon in which he criticizes Pavelic. Even the fact 
that he was eventually punished by house arrest is differently 
interpreted by intersted parties: Serbs say he was spared, because 
Tito could not afford to offend Vatican by killing the highest 
ranking Catholic priest in the region; Croats say that Tito's people 
in the early years after the war were so trigger-happy that they 
killed anybody on the slightest suspicion of enemy collaboration and 
that the only reason he was spared was his innocence. Things like 
that remained not discussed about openly in public and thus unsolved 
for decades contributing to mistrust between ethnic groups of former 
Yugoslavia, creating a fertile soil for war, once communists became 
too weak and too tired to enforce the obedience to their rule. 
ivo

On 30 May 2004 at 12:30, jkraljic at gwtlaw.com wrote:

Two points concerning what Ivo has written - first a minor one on the
name HSP - it does not mean the Croatian Party of Justice but the
Croatian Party of "State" Rights.  It takes its name from Ante
Starcevic's party.  Starcevic used the name in the sense of "state
rights," i.e., the rights the Croatian kingdom had vis a vis Hungary
and Austria.

I have also seen an interpretation that the name derived from
Starvevic's distinction between pseudo-Croats and "true" Croats 
(pravi
Hrvati).  This did not mean a genetic/ethnic differentiation
(Starcevic was half-Serb, after all), but a political differentiation
to set apart his followers from those seeking to resolve Croatia's
plight through cooperation with Hungarians, Austrians, Serbs, and
others.

More importantly, I completely disagree with Ivo's equation of
Mihailovic with the killing of innocent civilians.  Mihailovic was a
member of the Yugolsav Government (Minister of the Army) and the
titular head of the "Yugoslav Army in the Homeland."  The evidence is
overwhelming that people who claimed to be loyal to Mihailovic
committed genocidal acts against innocent Croat and Muslims civilians
while at the same time receiving the assistance and support of 
Italian
troops.

Moreover, there is no question that Mihailovic stabbed Tito and the
Partisans in the back at Uzice in Serbia in 1941.  We have this on 
the
authority of Milovan Djilas himself, who would have had no particular
reason to try to falsify what occurred at Uzice.  Djilas also has
horrifying descriptions of what he saw in Foca after the Chetniks
withdrew from that town.

Most English-language works that I have read concerning the question
of Mihailovic concede that he knew what was going on.  Those who are
apologetic for his acts sought to justify it by claiming that he 
could
not exercise control over his troops.  That is questionable at best.

Mihailovic was a military man.  As such, his fate cannot be compared
with civilians and lower ranking soldiers who were massacred by the
thousands after the war by Tito.

One can certainly question whether in the conditions that existed in
1946 Mihailovic could have received a fair judicial trial.  I
certainly concede that the court was a kangaroo court, no less than
the courts used to judge the former officials of the NDH.  However,
this does not shift the weight of historical evidence which is not in
Mihailovic's favor.

Set forth below is an excerpt of a translation of an article by
historian Zlatko Dizdar, "Italian Policies Toward Croatian 
Territories
and Their Results During the Second World War" which originally
appeared in Croatian in the work "Talijanksa uprava na Hrvatskom
prostoru i egzodus Hrvata (1918-1943), Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za
povijest, 2001.  The article includes a description of the work of 
the
Chetniks in the coastal areas of Croatia during WWII which will
hopefull further elucidate on this issue.

I note that the "Djujic" mentioned in this excerpt is Momcilo Djujic,
who died in California several years ago.  NY Times reporter, David
Binder, who openly admits his love for the Chetniks, wrote a glowing
obituary of Djujic.  Apparently, the New York Times did not see "fit
to print" anything concerning the crimes he had been accused of.  
Just
knowing that fact, and after reading this excerpt, should lead people
to wonder how destructive Binder's influence was in coloring the
perceptions of what was happening in the foremer Yugoslavia in the
early 1990s.

John Kraljic

***********************

 "The first contacts between Italian commanders and leaders of 
Chetnik
 forces began as a result of the uprising and revolt during July and
 August 1941.  After the outbreak of the uprising, the Italians
 allowed as early as September 1941 Chetnik military forces (starting
 with units, then regiments, and toward the end of 1941, brigades) to
 be organized under their wing in the area of their occupational zone
 in the NDH.  Consisting of Greater Serbian nationalists, these 
forces
 were to be used to battle against the Partisans.  The actions of the
 Chetniks, along with the support of the Italian occupier, led to the
 shattering of the uprising in certain parts of Dalmatia and southern
 Lika and afterwards in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

By the end of 1941, Italian commanders established contacts with the
most important Chetnik leaders in those areas of the NDH that had 
been
reoccupied by Italian forces (S. Radjenovi?, M. Djuji?, I. 
Trifunovi?,
D. Jevdjevic, B. Todorovi?).  The Italians brought them under their
influence and control and included them in the common "fight against
Communism."  On the basis of a series of agreements, the increased
growth of the organization and strengthening of and union with 
Chetnik
forces in the entire Italian occupied area in the NDH continued.  The
support provided by the Italians, including necessary supplies, will
be used in the "cleansing" of the non-Serb population, especially
Croats and Muslims in these areas.

We find the programmatic bases of the Chetnik movement in a series of
documents of Chetnik leaders and ideologues from that time.  It is
suffient to mention the project of Stevan Moljevi?, "Homogenous
Serbia," dated 30 June 1941, the Instructions of General Draza
Mihailovi? of 20 December 1941, and the "Survey of the Chetnik 
Dinaric
Division" from March 1942.  They all had the same programmatic goal:
the creation of a so-called Greater Serbia at the expense of the
historical and national territories of the Croatian and Muslim 
peoples
(as well as certain others), and the establishment of a direct common
border between Serbia-Montenegro and Slovenia.  They tied these goals
with the cleansing of these areas of their "Muslim and Catholic
population" because only Serbs could live in such a Serbia.  
According
the Draza's program, more than 90% of the NDH's territory, in which
more than 2.5 million Catholics and over 800,000 Muslims lived(making
up around 70% of the inhabitants, with Serbs making up close to 30% 
of
the remaining population) would become part of such a Serbia.  All of
these Croats and Muslims, together with certain other non-Serbs from
these areas, had to be eliminated in keeping with Draza's
Instructions.  That "cleansing" or more specifically "extermination"
of the non-Serb population had to be carried out by Chetnik forces
(something the Chetniks did everytime they had the chance to do so). 
Thus the programmatic bases of the Chetnik movement in practice 
became
the foundation for genocidal crimes executed by Chetnik forces 
against
Croats and Muslims during the Second World War.

 The Italians bear a large part of the responsibility for these
 crimes.  One need only keep in mind eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina
 where, pursuant to an agreement, the Italians gradually surrendered
 their control of the area to the Chetniks.  Massive crimes involving
 the extinction of the Muslim and Croat population ensued (from
 Visegrad, through Gorazde, ?ajnica, Fo?a to Nevesinje).  The 
Chetniks
 killed several thousand, and thousands of others fled.

 The Chetnik leadership clearly knew the goals the Italians had in 
the
 region and they sought to exploit it to achieve their own plans.  In
 one report meant for Mihailovi?, Jevdjevi? discussed the tactic of
 cooperating with the Italian occupier and noted his contacts with
 representatives of the Italian military toward the end of 1941.  He
 claimed that ". . . Italy is terribly unhappy with the borders of 
the
 Croatian state and is ready, in accordance with their political
 traditions, to now incite the Serbs against the Croats. . . .  [if]
 their is a possibility of pulling out some advantage for the Serbian
 people from this game, we [must] accept it."

 The Italians planned that in the event of a victory of Fascist 
forces
 to favor the Serbs "in northern Dalmatia and western Bosnia and 
after
 the war to force a plebiscite in the area for its union with Italy."
 . . . . "[I]n the remainder of Bosnia and Herzegovina [they] wanted
 to unite the Serbs and Muslims and to have that majority, consisting
 of 80% of the population, seek some sort of autonomy for Bosnia 
under
 an Italian protectorate."  At the same time, the Italians had an
 alternative plan for the Montenegrin federalists of "attaching
 Herzegovina to a Greater Montenegro."  Jedjevi? noted that if the
 Italians "nevertheless lost the war, this policy of sympathy toward
 the Serbs might be able to lower their accountability at the peace
 conference."

 This tactical cooperation would lead to "saving [the Serbs] from
 Ustasha massacres," the takeover of arms and supply of food from the
 Italians, and the "establishment of a large half-liberated zone in
 which one could without interference carry out the political and
 military organization of the Serbian people."  As a result, Chetnik
 leaders in a number of instances roused "Italy to realize its
 pretensions and to occupy all of Bosnia, so that we would have
 greater room for our activities."  However, "the Germans quickly
 stopped every such attempt by the Italians, preventing Italian
 divisions from [crossing over] the demarcation line."

 For tactical reasons, Chetnik commanders attempted to include in
 their formations part of the pro-Serb oriented Muslims and
 pro-Yugoslav Croat population, but given their practice of 
committing
 genocide against Muslims and Croats they did not have any success.

 The new commander of the Italian Second Army, General Mario Roatta,
 who succeeded General Ambrosio, attempted though political
 discussions on the ground to turn the situation to Italy's favor 
with
 the support of the Chetniks.  He allowed for the formation of 
Chetnik
 forces on the basis of an agreement to legalize them and included
 them as the Militia voluntaria anticomunista (the Volunteer
 Anti-Communist Militia) within the Second Italian Army under the 
same
 conditions as Italian soldiers in the battle against the Communists
 and the Partisans.  In May 1942 the Italians had 8,000 to 9,000
 Chetniks within the Second Italian Army and that number rose to
 around 15,000 by October 1942, and to about 20,000 in the first half
 of 1943.  Mihailovi? approved of this cooperation.  In this regard,
 General G. Zanussi noted that "the more we included Chetniks in our
 battles, the more the possibilities for the success of our troops
 increased while decreasing our exposure to losses.  Other than using
 them in battle against the rebels, the Chetniks worked in our favor
 as a counterweight in relation to the Ustasha and the Germans. 
 Having as our friend these enemies of our supposed friend - 10,000 
to
 15,000 men steeled in the difficulties and cunning of the savage
 Balkan wars - presented a pawn whose value could not be
 underestimated."

 All of these Chetnik forces had to be paid for by the NDH government
 and it had to continue to support them after the Zagreb agreement 
(19
 June 1942) and the withdrawal of the Italians from the III and part
 of the II Zones and the surrender of civilian authority to the NDH.

 Under the protective guard of the Italians, the Chetniks carried out
 a series of crimes which they organized and planned in order to 
bring
 to life their goal of a "Greater Serbia."  Thus, from September to
 December 1942 the Chetniks massacred around 70 Croats, mostly women
 and children, in northern Dalmatia and southern Lika where the
 Italians held military and civilian control, which caused a refugee
 wave of Croats from these areas to other parts of the NDH.  During
 the course of the Italian military operation code-named "Albia"
 against the Partisans in the Biokovo Mountains, the Chetniks
 massacred, executed and burned around 160 Croats, including three
 priests, in the area of the county (Velika zupa) of Cetina alone. 
 Their commander, Petar Bacovic, reported on this "punishment
 expedition" to D. Mihailovi? on 5 September 1942 writing that his
 Chetniks killed more than "1,000 Ustashe" while they had "not one
 dead or wounded [man]."  He reported that onn the way from Ljubuski
 to Vrgorac they "skinned three Catholic priests," killed "all the
 males 15 years old and older," and "completely burned 17 villages,"
 after which they went south of Makarska in song and with a Serbian
 flag "to the coast of our Adriatic where they planted our flag on 
the
 coast."

 Prior to this, the Chetniks in eastern Herzegovina, where they had
 taken over control (other than in the cities) in agreement with the
 Italians, killed several hundred Croats and Muslims from May to
 September 1942 after which the entire Croat and Muslim population on
 the left bank of the Neretva (around 30,000 people) fled to other
 areas of the NDH.

 During Italian military operations against the Partisans in the
 Prozor region in October 1942, the Chetniks first killed around 200
 Croats and Muslims in the Mostar region, and then in the Prozor area
 killed, slaughtered and threw into water or pits 1,716 people (340
 were Muslims and the rest Croat civilians).  On their return to the
 Konji? County, they killed around twenty Croats, plundering houses
 and villages many of which were burned.

 In an 23 October 1942 telegram Bacovic also reported to Draza
 Mihailovi?:  "During operations in Prozor more than 2,000 Sokaca
 [Catholics] and Muslims were slaughtered.  The soldiers returned 
with
 enthusiasm."

 Even though the Chetniks clearly considered all Croats and Muslims 
to
 be Ustasha and even though civilians numbered the only victims 
during
 these operations, neither the Italians nor their supreme commander
 reacted allowing the Chetniks to continue with their criminal
 genocide.

 At the beginning of October 1942 in the area of the Cetina County 
and
 under the direction and control of the Italians, "in supposed battle
 against the Partisans," Chetniks led by Vojvoda Mane Rokvi? killed
 and slaughtered around 200 Croats in the hinterland of Omis and set
 fire to many houses after plundering them.  As the Italians wrote:
 "Mostly older people, women and children who had absolutely no
 connections to the Partisans were slaughtered."  Thereafter the
 Chetniks of Vojvoda Mom?ilo Djuji? on 21 October 1942 in Bitelica,
 near Sinj, under Italian direction, killed 29 and in Otisica 6
 Croats, having first burned 220 Croatian homes.  According to a
 report of General Berardia from Knin, the Chetniks in these actions
 "tortured and butchered every Catholic, and later most of the 
corpses
 were cut to pieces in the most brutal way."  All of them were
 civilians, but he did not react.  Djuji? immediately reported to
 Mihailovi? by telegram: "Moji su klali sreda!"

 At the end of January 1943, Dalmatian-Herzegovinian Chetniks from 
the
 area around Knin carried out actions, within the context of wider
 offensive activities of the Italian Army against the Partisans,
 toward the villages in the Vrlicka area, killing over 100 Croats and
 raping women and young girls, all under the slogan to "burn and
 butcher all that is Catholic."  At this time they nailed 68 year old
 Niko Blazevi? to a spit and cooked him until he died, while in
 Otavica, 86 year old Ilija Mestrovi?, the uncle of famous Croat
 sculptor Ivan Mestrovi?, was thrown alive into a burning house and
 was killed. By February 1, 1943, Draza Mihailovi? had received the
 report of these actions: "In Kijevo and Vrlika Bacovic executed 55
 and in Maovaca and Otavica Djujic executed 48 Ustashe."  Thereafter
 on 3 and 4 February 1943, Herzegovinian Chetniks in the region of
 Imotski and its surrounding villages slaughtered and killed 32
 Croats, plundering and destroying property, burning houses, and
 raping girls and women.  In all these actions, only Croat civilians
 fell, who for the Chetniks considered to be all Ustashe; not one 
Serb
 nor any village inhabited by Serbs came under attack.  These actions
 resulted in 3,000 Croat refugees fleeing to Sinj alone.

 In these actions the Italians usually transported the Chetniks to 
the
 place of operations and surrounded the settlements so as to prevent
 the inhabitants from fleeing.  They thereafter allowed the Chetniks
 to deal with the unarmed populace and divided the booty with them
 afterwards.

 It needs to be said that the Italians sought through their Second
 Army to exploit the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The Muslims
 found themselves in an ever more complicated and difficult position
 and exposed to genocide.  The Italians wanted to used the Muslims as
 a political tool to support their goal in occupying the Croatian
 coastline and the Herzegovinian hinterland and to establish a
 protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Some, such as General
 Giuseppe Pieche, believed this to be a possible economic and 
military
 solution for Dalmatia, even though Italian forces had withdrawn from
 a substantial portion of the area.  As a result, they accepted the
 formation of a number of anti-Communist Muslim units (bands) under
 Italian oversight, following the visit to Rome of a Muslim 
autonomist
 delegation from Mostar in November 1942.  They viewed these units as
 a counterweight to the Chetniks, but also as a tool against the NDH. 

 After the Chetnik massacres, the Italians also had to allow part of
 the Croats in Dalmatia and Herzegovina (in the II Zone) to establish
 armed formations.  But, in practice the establishment of cooperation
 between Italians and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained
 subordinate to Italian-Chetnik cooperation and as result did not
 became important either in number or in activities.

 The British government reacted in connection to the news of the
 above-mentioned Chetnik massacres (though more so as a result of
 their even more terrible massacres of Muslims, especially in eastern
 Bosnia and the neighboring areas of Sandzak, carried out from 
January
 to March 1943 under the oversight and command of Draza Mihailovi?). 
 These massacres had been made possible by the Italian turnover of
 their administration in these areas to the Chetniks and supplying
 them with arms, food and money, as well as by permitting them to be
 transported from Serbia and Montenegro.  On 1 May 1943 the British
 government informed Mihailovi? that the Chetnik leadership needed to
 "soften their position" toward the Muslims.  Soon after legendary
 French General Charles DeGaulle, the leader of the Free French
 movement, based on false information provided by Slobodan 
Jovanovi?'s
 exiled Yugoslav government, awarded medals D. Mihailovi?, Zaharija
 Ostoji? and a number of other Chetnik commanders who participated in
 the above mentioned actions and had been responsible for the 
greatest
 of massacres.  They took such awards as being an initiative to
 continue with such actions.

 It must be emphasized that the Chetniks without exception killed all
 antifascist Croats and Muslims, activists, soldiers and Partisans
 they captured.  For example, the Dinarska Chetnik Division alone 
from
 25 May 1942 to 15 June 1942 in battles with the Partisans, counted
 "over 500 Partisan corpses, mostly Croats."  Somewhat later in 1942
 in Rujista the Chetniks captured 23 Croat Partisans and executed 
them
 for which they received a 10,000 lira award from the Italians and
 which was the biggest initiative for the crime.

 The Chetniks victimized Serb antifascists as well, especially during
 the January-March 1943 offensive, in which the Chetniks participated
 as units of the MVAC, that is, as an integral part of Italian 
forces,
 in operations from the Gorski kotar, Lika and Kordun, and across
 northern Dalmatia and southwestern Bosnia to Herzegovina.

 Even to this day, all of the Chetnik victims, like all of the 
Ustasha
 victims, have yet to be identified, especially those resulting from
 combined actions under the operative and actual command of the
 commander of the Second Italian Army and his subordinate corps and
 division commanders in the area of the II and III Italian Occupation
 Zones in the NDH."
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