<nettime> Fw: [Nettime-ro] total fertility rate

[integer at www.god-emil.dk]

>the reason i am posting this is the unexpected twist it takes on the demography
>crisis when it points at the wise US policies of encouraging immigration even
>in those sour times of anti-terro effort, therefore ensuring for itself on
>medium term the position of savior of Western civilization. (see especially
>last paragraph)  the olde-Europe vs. virile-America (what is America, once
>more? - I thought there are more countries in that continent).
>
>hm


draga calin

as you very well aware are the new york times isnt precisely the organ of repeated joys among the simply.superior 
[.ro l!f 4rmz = dzat b! default - dez!gur]


fertility rate one other factor is. one other is - in our v.modern society in addition to freedom + power humans expect privacy*
particularly in the united states of america (as you indicate a nameless country indeed)

0. ie. the number of single households has increased dramatically
2. ie. the land size necessary to maintain life functions in a human being has increased
4. ie. the issue isn't only the number of mostly disposable [in my extremely humble opinion] humans

in other words the new york times article is partly disposable.

<=> 0.2.4. conducive are to lowered unsanitary activities + increased personal introspection [no doubt]


servus. nn



* love may be purchased - very affordably [ost.europa = simply.SUPERIOR








>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Sebastian Bertalan" <sebastian at bertalan.de>
>To: <nettime-ro at nettime.org>
>Sent: Thursday, March 13, 2003 12:14 PM
>Subject: [Nettime-ro] total fertility rate
>
>
>> The New York Times, 2003 March 08
>>
>> It Will Be a Smaller World After All
>> By BEN J. WATTENBERG
>>
>> Remember the number 1.85. It is the lodestar of a new demography that will
>> lead us to a different world. It should change the way we think about
>> economics, geopolitics, the environment, culture - and about ourselves.
>>
>> To make their calculations orderly, demographers have typically worked on
>> the assumption that the "total fertility rate" - the number of children born
>> per woman - would eventually average out to 2.1. Why 2.1? At that rate the
>> population stabilizes over time: a couple has two children, the parents
>> eventually die, and their children "replace" them. (The 0.1 accounts for
>> children who die before reaching the age of reproduction.)
>>
>> Now, in a new report, United Nations demographers have bowed to reality and
>> changed this standard 2.1 assumption. For the last five years they have been
>> examining one of the most momentous trends in world history: the startling
>> decline in fertility rates over the last several decades. In the United
>> Nations' most recent population report, the fertility rate is assumed to be
>> 1.85, not 2.1. This will lead, later in this century, to global population
>> decline.
>>
>> In a world brought up on the idea of a "population explosion," this is a
>> radical notion. The world's population is still growing - it will take some
>> time for it to actually start shrinking - but the next crisis is
>> depopulation.
>>
>> The implications of lower fertility rates are far-reaching. One of the most
>> profound is their potential to reduce economic inequality around the world
>> and alter the balance of power among nations.
>>
>> The United Nations divides the world into two groups, less developed
>> countries and more developed countries. The most surprising news comes from
>> the poorer countries. In the late 1960's, these countries had an average
>> fertility rate of 6.0 children per woman. Today it is 2.9 - and still
>> falling. Huge and continuing declines have been seen in countries like
>> Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Turkey and (of great importance to
>> the United States) Mexico.
>>
>> The more developed countries, in contrast, have seen their fertility rates
>> fall from low to unsustainable. Every developed nation is now below
>> replacement level. In the early 1960's, Europe's fertility rate was 2.6.
>> Today the rate is 1.4, and has been sinking for half a century. In Japan the
>> rate is 1.3.
>>
>> These changes give poorer countries a demographic dividend. For several
>> decades the bulk of their population will be of working age, with relatively
>> few dependents, old or young. This should lead to higher per capita incomes
>> and production levels. Nations with low fertility rates, meanwhile, will
>> face major fiscal and political problems. In a pay-as-you-go pension system,
>> for example, there will be fewer workers to finance the pensions of
>> retirees; people will either have to pay more in taxes or work longer.
>>
>> Among the more developed countries, the United States is the outlier nation,
>> with the highest fertility rate - just under 2.1. Moreover, the United
>> States takes in more immigrants than the rest of the world combined.
>> Accordingly, in the next 50 years America will grow by 100 million people.
>> Europe will lose more than 100 million people.
>>
>> When populations stabilize and then actually shrink, the economic
>> dislocations can be severe. Will there be far less demand for housing and
>> office space? Paradoxically, a very low fertility rate can also yield labor
>> shortages, pushing wages higher. Of course, such shortages in countries with
>> low fertility rates could be alleviated by immigration from countries with
>> higher fertility rates - a migration from poor countries to rich ones. But
>> Europeans are actively trying to reduce immigration, especially since 9/11.
>> Wisely, America has mostly resisted calls for restrictions on immigrants.
>>
>> The environmental future, however, looks better. Past research on global
>> warming was based on a long-term United Nations projection, issued in the
>> early 1990's, of 11.6 billion people in 2200, far more people than we're ever
>> likely to see. The new projections show the global population rising from
>> just over six billion now to just under nine billion in 2050, followed by a
>> decline, moving downward in a geometric progression.
>>
>> With fewer people than expected, pollution should decrease from expected
>> levels, as should consumption of oil. Clean water and clean air should be
>> more plentiful. We know that many of these people will be richer - driving
>> more cars, consuming more resources. We also know that wealthy countries
>> tend to be better at cleaning up their pollution than poor nations. With
>> fewer people, open spaces should also be more abundant.
>>
>> Still, it is the geopolitical implications of this change that may well be
>> the most important. There is not a one-to-one relationship between
>> population and power. But numbers matter. Big nations, or big groups of
>> nations acting in concert, can become major powers. China and India each
>> have populations of more than a billion; their power and influence will
>> almost surely increase in the decades to come. Europe will shrink and age,
>> absolutely and relatively.
>>
>> Should the world face a "clash of civilizations," America may find itself
>> with weaker allies. It may then be forced to play a greater role in
>> defending and promoting the liberal, pluralist beliefs and values of Western
>> civilization. We may have to do more, not because we want to, but because we
>> have to.
>>
>> Ben J. Wattenberg, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is
>> author of "The Birth Dearth."
>>
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>
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