Partners in (war) crime
Ivo Skoric
vze3c9dm at verizon.net
Thu Jun 12 19:37:51 CEST 2003
Today US State Department is sending a delegation to Croatia to
persuade Croatian government into signing the infamous Article 98.
Tiny Croatia has been the most stubborn of the post-communist
"New Europe" countries in its refusal to do the bidding of the
American Empire.
Bush government wants as many countries as possible to sign on
the article 98, agreeing not to surrender/extradite American
servicemen (citizen or selective non-citizen) to the International
Criminal Court. Effectively, the US is demanding that their troops
are treated as if they are above the law.
That posture provoked disgust among other Western democracies.
So, the US administrations ventured on looking for smaller
countries, economically weak, politically unstable, that could be
cajoled and/or coerced into signing that article. So far they got 35.
In case of Croatia, the US ambassador to Croatia issued a
blackmail that the US will not approve $19 million in military aid on
July 1st, if Croatian does not sign Article 98.
On the other hand, Croatia's main economic partners are in the
Western Europe (Germany), and there Croatia may loose support if
its government sign that article. This is a no-win situation for
Croatia: if it signs, it loses its European friends, if it doesn't sign it
loses its American friends.
Therefore, pure moral judgement took Croatian government so far
on not signing the article that creates a double standard in the
world of international law.
The circumstances around Article 98 in Croatia are more
complicated with the case of Ante Gotovina, a Croatian general
wanted by the ICTY in The Hague, for his command responsibility
in Croatian military Operation Storm in 1995, during which a certain
number of war crimes ocurred.
Western European democracies are adamant in demanding co-
operation with the ICTY from Croatia. On the other hand, Croatian
government is politically weak and susceptible to populist
opposition, which is all enlisted against surrendering general
Gotovina to The Hague. So, this is yet another no-win situation for
the current Croatian government: if they surrender Gotovina, they
lose political ground at home, if they do not surrender Gotovina,
they lose their allies in Europe.
Racan chose to procrastinate (a trait in which he is particularly
good). But what is the US position on Gotovina case? Word
hypocrisy comes to mind: their position is curiously the same with
Western Europe's on that issue - they demand that Gotovina is
surrendered to The Hague.
Croatia already decided to try Gotovina, a war crimes suspect,
domestically - this is the same what the Article 98 would provide
for the US war crimes suspects: that they are tried by the US
courts. Yet, the US, which blackmails Croatia by $19 million into
signing an agreement that would prevent surrendering of the US
war crimes suspects to international courts, at the same time
demands from Croatia to surrender Croatian own war crimes
suspect to the international court.
My only conclusion is that Bush has a God complex.
Croatia can chose between four options:
1) do not sign article 98, do not surrender Gotovina to the ICTY
pros: gaining favor in W. Europe, political stability at home
cons: loosing US support, being more dependent on EU
2) sign article 98, do not surrender Gotovina to the ICTY
pros: becoming the US 'teacher's pet'
cons: earning cold shoulder in EU, strengthening HDZ opposition
3) do not sign article 98, surrender Gotovina to the ICTY
pros: earning respect in W. Europe
cons: angering the US, provoking almost certain unrests in the
country
4) sign article 98, surrender Gotovina to the ICTY
pros: satisfying both US and EU demands
cons: being viewed as a foreign agent, losing political ground
domestically in favor of dubitable and ever changing international
alliances
My feeling is that Europe would understand if Croatia signs Article
98, and that the US would understand if Croatia does not surrender
Gotovina. So, the US support would primarily be assured by the
article 98 signature, while Europes by the surrender of Gotovina.
However, there are no guarantees that Europe would not hold
Croatia's article 98 signature against it, or that the US would forever
drop the demand for Gotovina to be surrendered to The Hague: this
is just the fate of small countries - to always be bullied by the
bigger ones.
In the following thoughtful and provocative op-ed, Miles Raguz,
former diplomat (first for Bosnians, then for Croats) introduces
another interesting argument: that Croatia's 1995 Operation Storm
was de facto a US military operation in which Croatian military
forces were the proxy for US ground forces, serving the US
interests in the Balkans, primarily in changing the balance of power
in Bosnia.
A quote from 1995 Washington Post op-ed is provided:
>>To recall a Washington Post editorial three days before Zagreb
commenced its operation: "All along the United States and
its allies have been looking for a force - other than themselves -
that could check Serbian and Bosnian Serb adventurism and
produce a military balance on which realistic settlement could be
built. Maybe such a force is now emerging: Croatia."<<
In that light, general Ante Gotovina, was not only a commander of
Croatian military operation, but also a lead operational foreign
agent, an employee of US interests, a "contractor" protected by
the language of Article 98 from being surrendered to international
courts. That would mean that legally, if Croatia signs Article 98, it
could not surrender Ante Gotovina to the ICTY, without breaking
the article 98 agreement with the U.S.
In other words, if Croatia signs article 98, the US would be breaking
their own rules if they would continue to demand that Croatia
surrenders their own operative to the Hague. It is clear that this
would lead to the solution #2, which I believe, Miles thinks it would
be the best for Croatian interests. I would just advise caution: it
may be perilous becoming too close with so widely unpopular US
administration, which may change in a year.
ivo
------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
Zagreb weekly "Globus"
June 13, 2003
Can Dispute on Article 98 Lead to Gains for Both Croatia and U.S.
By: V.M. Raguz
It should come as no surprise that Washington is sending an impressive
delegation to Zagreb on Thursday, June 12th to argue its case on Article 98, and to
hear out Croatia's position. The tiny little Croatia has begun to confuse the
United States of late.
Last year Zagreb raised a lot of noise about on the indictment of Gen. Janko
Bobetko, until then an unprecedented step for the cooperative Racan
government. It appears to have been an omen of things to come. Later, it was the only
"New Europe" state to challenge the legitimacy of the Iraq intervention.
Initially it agreed to provide assistance by granting overflight rights. However, on
the eve of the invasion, president Stipe Mesic delivered a primetime address
to the nation with emotion and wordage straight from Jacque Chirac's book of
drama. Now, Croatia has decided to play a rare David to US Goliath on the issue
of Article 98 exclusions.
Washington wants Zagreb to sign on to the list of 35 states that have
committed themselves not to extradite US citizens and select groups of non-citizens
serving abroad to the ICC and similar courts that claim universal jurisdiction.
The US fears many legally groundless and politically motivated lawsuits in
the future. This is an understandable contingency given America's expanding role
as world policeman, and substantial, if short history of such courts being
prone to judicial and political activism packaged for CNN sound-bite reporting,
rather than jurisprudence and justice. But Croatia says no, despite the threat
of US aid sanctions effective July 1.
While its flip-flop on Iraq was unnecessary and shortsighted, Croatia's
position on Article 98 is justified. Moreover, its high ground just may compel
Washington to rethink its universal jurisdiction policy that is full of legal and
moral inconsistencies, and thereby eliminate a key criticism, next to the Kyto
Protocol issue, that the rest of the world has against the US.
Washington is inconsistent in several ways.
Firstly, the US is exercising its sovereign right to protect its citizens
from frivolous and colored lawsuits at universal jurisdiction courts, yet it
denies that same right to some other states, one being Croatia. As was Gen. Janko
Bobetko earlier, a number of Croatian citizens are still subject to groundless
and policy motivated lawsuits at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia at The Hague, the precursor to the ICC. The policy being
"all sides are equally guilty."
The US has insisted that they and Croatia should cooperate with the
Prosecution at the Tribunal, no questions asked, despite strong legal and factual
objections in some cases. At times, suggestions come that the innocents should go
to The Hague and prove their cases, a curious position when in the West it is
illegal to try innocent persons. Furthermore, the Prosecution is just one
partial side at the Tribunal, and it should not have the conclusive word and
unqualified support, as it seems to have on the policy level.
Secondly, Washington does not recognize the ICC primarily because of the
trendy concept in international criminal law - the command responsibility - used
in its widest form at the Tribunal. Under this principle any and every senior
leader is liable for just about anything. Such lawsuits filed in Belgium and
elsewhere against Colin Powell for the first intervention in Iraq, Gen. Tommy
Franks for the recent intervention, and Henry Kissinger for his alleged role in
Chile are not taken seriously in Washington. Yet, Croatia is asked to abide by
the same principle in the Gotovina indictment, and others yet to come.
Thirdly, the US has sidestepped its obligation to provide exculpatory
evidence in many cases at the Tribunal even though all states are mandated by the
Security Council to do so. Washington possesses ample evidence that would nullify
a number of indictments. For instance, if the US were to yield evidence about
the objectives of the Storm, and how it was carried out, the case of Gen.
Gotovina would be thrown out. Similarly, the Tribunal's decisions in Blaskic,
Kordic and similar cases, as they concern Croatia's role in BiH in 1992-93, would
be revised.
Croatia's role in BiH was substantial indeed, but stabilizing rather than
aggressive. Zagreb's policy in BiH should not be judged by the actions of some
local sheriffs that were all too often motivated by personal gain. Washington
knew this at the time, and could provide evidence in this direction.
Fourthly, Washington is inconsistent on who exactly it protects thru Article
98 agreements. In some agreements, it protects all US citizens and residents,
as well as employees of US interest operations that it calls "contractors."
In other instances, such as in the May agreement with BiH, the protection is
extended only to the US citizens and military personnel. Third-country citizens
working for American non-military institutions are left out.
Finally, the US has just about forgotten about its tradition of protecting
front line allies and nameless foreign agents in the same way it protects its
citizens. At a time when Washington will need numerous foreign proxies to help
fight its war on terrorism, and will rely on many friendly governments such as
Poland to support US-led solutions in Iraq and elsewhere, this gray policy
area must be colored over quickly.
In 1995, Croatia was such an ally. To recall a Washington Post editorial
three days before Zagreb commenced its operation: "All along the United States and
its allies have been looking for a force - other than themselves - that could
check Serbian and Bosnian Serb adventurism and produce a military balance on
which realistic settlement could be built. Maybe such a force is now
emerging: Croatia."
If Croatia were such a proxy in 1995, as it certainly was, than Gen. Gotovina
was a lead operational agent on the ground. The troops under his command were
used to break the siege of the UN safe area of Bihac, a key interest of the
US at the time, and later as ground advance component that supplemented the
US-led NATO bombings of Serb troops in western Bosnia. This joint action altered
the territorial control in Bosnia between the Serbs and the Muslim-Croat
coalition close to territorial split envisioned in the US peace plan on the table
at that time, and later concluded in Dayton. Interestingly, in this context,
Gen. Gotovina would be entitled to US protection as "contractor" in the language
of some Article 98 agreements.
The current dispute should not overlook that crucial partnership, but rather
serve as an occasion for reflection in regard to the inconsistent policy that
is hurting the US interests worldwide, and alienating Croatia.
Zagreb's position is that due its EU aspirations, it should follow the policy
directives of Brussels, which is strongly opposed to giving preferences to
Americans on universal jurisdiction issues. This may be a key reason, but not
the overwhelming one. The fact of the matter is that Croatia is losing
confidence in the possibilities in a partnership with the US.
While it did the "dirty work" for the US in 1995 in BiH, and the Racan
government proved to be extremely cooperative in respect of key US interests in the
Southeast Europe, its management of BiH, it has received almost nothing in
return. Not even a timely NATO membership, which Croatia deserves, and where the
US has a sole vote. Instead, just headaches: from ever new US demands at the
OSCE, to being left out in the cold at the Tribunal. The public outrage by
Goran Granic directed at some diplomats in Zagreb recently, that mentioned the US
Embassy, can be instructive.
How to get out of this impasse? As of now Washington has proposed a win-lose
solution: it gains a safety net for its citizens, but Croatia continues to
receive nothing. Zagreb has tabled a solution that in the West would be labeled
typically Balkan; lose-lose: it appears we cannot gain, so neither should
you. But somewhere there must be that win-win solution as well. Its elements are
obvious: the US should gain on the ICC, and Croatia should gain at the
Tribunal. But given the developments between the two, the question remains whether
either of the two sides will have the strength to even address it on Thursday.
The above is the extended version of the oped that ran in Globus in Croatian.
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